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‘Once Upon a Time there was a Wonderful Country’: 
Representations of History in Rwanda 
Deborah Mayersen, University of Wollongong 
Abstract 
In April 1994, genocide erupted in Rwanda with an unprecedented ferocity.  Over the course 
of 100 days, more than 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed.  A major contributor to 
the violence was an intense propaganda campaign that dehumanised and demonised the Tutsi 
minority prior to and during the genocide.  This propaganda presented the Tutsi as foreign 
and feudal oppressors, who would again oppress the Hutu majority as they had in the past if 
they were not targeted for extermination.  Such dubious representations of history have deep 
roots in Rwanda, which can be traced to the early colonial period.  This article will explore 
three examples of the way in which history has been represented and misrepresented in 
Rwanda, spanning from colonial to contemporary periods. It will consider how key 
stakeholders have sometimes portrayed Rwanda’s history in skewed and inaccurate ways, and 
the profound impact this has had on ethnic divisions within the country.  Moreover, it will 
examine how misrepresentations of Rwanda’s history are continuing in the post-genocide 
period.  It is only through interrogating (mis)representations of Rwanda’s history that the 
political agendas that have and continue to shape them can be exposed and challenged.   
 
Introduction 
Accounts of genocide do not typically begin with the phrase “Once upon a time there was a 
wonderful country” (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 2011, p. 8).  Yet this is 
precisely how the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (ICTR) outreach program 
began its account of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, published in full colour, graphic novel 
format.  Within a few pages, idyllic images of farmers on rolling green hills are replaced by 
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those of machete-wielding genocidaires and mass graves, before the document moves on to 
explain the transitional justice process.  The ‘cartoon book’, as the document is called, is 
designed to “convey the events of the genocide at both personal and national levels to 
children eight years of age and above” (ICTR 2011, p. 6).  Yet the manner in which such 
events are conveyed is highly selective.  The withdrawal of United Nations peacekeepers 
from Rwanda as the genocide commenced is only obliquely mentioned, and there is no 
mention of the absence of the international community as the genocide progressed 
unimpeded.  The role of the ICTR is presented as heroic, but there is no discussion of 
Rwanda-based transitional justice efforts.  This document is just one of many examples in 
which Rwanda’s history has been presented in a skewed and selective manner for political 
purposes.  In this paper I will explore three critical examples of (mis)representations of 
Rwanda’s history, which span the colonial and postcolonial periods.  I demonstrate that these 
externally imposed, politically motivated representations of Rwanda’s history have had a 
major, deleterious impact on Rwanda in the past.  Furthermore, the ICTR ‘cartoon book’ 
suggests there is the potential for these historical processes to continue into the future.  While 
representations of history are always subjective to some extent, the experience in Rwanda – 
perhaps more than that in any other country – highlights the need for great awareness and 
care in representing the past.   
 
Colonial Representations of Rwanda’s History 
Astonishingly, colonial representations and misrepresentations of Rwanda’s history began 
even before the first European visited the territory.  The most deleterious historical 
misrepresentation, the Hamitic hypothesis, was proposed by explorer John Hanning Speke as 
an ethnological theory concerning the peoples of the region.   For Speke, the Christian bible 
was the ethnological instrument through which African peoples could be categorised:  
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 We should, when contemplating these [African] sons of Noah, try and carry our mind 
 back to that time when our poor elder brother Ham was cursed by his father, and 
 condemned to be the slave of both Shem and Japheth; for as they were then, so they 
 appear to be now — a strikingly existing proof of the Holy Scriptures (Speke 1863,  
 introduction). 
For Speke and others of his time, the idea that ‘negroid’ races could have the intelligence and 
development to organise and rule the complex kingdoms being discovered in central Africa 
was deeply challenging to contemporary theories of white racial superiority.  The Hamitic 
hypothesis resolved this issue by proposing that the ruling groups encountered were 
migratory descendants of Noah’s son Ham.  They were thus not truly ‘negro’, but the lowest 
rung on the Caucasian ladder (Mamdani 2001, pp. 82, 84).  As descendants of Noah’s cursed 
son Ham, however, they remained (comfortably) inferior to Europeans (Mamdani 2001, pp. 
80-87).  Speke thus declared pastoral and ruling groups throughout the region, collectively 
known as the Wahuma, were “Christians of the greatest antiquity”, despite acknowledging 
they “lost their religion, forgot their language” and pursued native customs (Speke 1863, ch. 
9). 
 
Speke never reached Rwanda, but he came close enough to encounter pastoral Tutsi groups.  
He noted that the Tutsi were “strictly pastoral” and “in the equatorial regions affect to 
maintain large kingdoms” (Speke 1864, ch. 4).  He declared them to be “emigrants … of the 
same [Wahuma] stock” (Speke 1864, ch. 4).  The evidence for such deduction was slight and 
Speke himself noted wide gaps in supporting evidence for this theory.  Contradictory 
evidence was overlooked, or explained away.  For Speke, the overriding factor was “the one 
distinguishing mark, the physical appearance of this remarkable race” (Speke 1863, ch. 9).  
That the Wahuma had no oral history of such an origin, and a remembered history of coming 
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to the area from the east, rather than the north, was disregarded.  So too was the (erroneous) 
Wahuma belief that Africa formerly belonged to the Europeans and had been taken back by 
their African allies.  Curiously, the common traditional account given by the reigning 
monarchs of “having once been half white and half  black, with hair on the white side 
straight, and on the black side frizzly”, is perceived as supportive of the hypothesis, despite 
its fantastical nature (Speke 1863, ch. 9).  On this slight evidence, Speke’s theory gained 
widespread acceptance, and would have a dramatic impact on Rwanda for over a century.   
 
Rwanda was ‘allocated’ to Germany as part of German East Africa at the Berlin conference 
in 1885, although it was not until 1894 that German Count Gustav Adolf von Götzen became 
the first European recorded as arriving there.  Götzen discovered a complex and highly 
organised kingdom in central Rwanda (with lessening degrees of control at the periphery).  
The Mwami, the Rwandan king, and a small Tutsi elite ruled over a population of largely 
agricultural Hutu (84 per cent), pastoral Tutsi (15 per cent) and hunter-gatherer Twa (1 per 
cent) inhabitants.  Following the arrival of the German colonial administration in Rwanda, 
anthropologists and ethnologists interpreted the physical differences between the Hutu, Tutsi 
and Twa as racial differences, in line with Speke’s theory, and further developed the Hamitic 
hypothesis.  Where, precisely, the Tutsi came from was the source of much conjecture.  
Southern Ethiopia and ancient Egypt were commonly proposed, although some of the more 
bizarre theories suggested India, Tibet, the lost continent of Atlantis and the Garden of Eden 
(Prunier 1995, pp. 7-8).  Of lasting consequence, however, were the three concepts at the 
heart of the theory: that the Tutsi were a distinct race, that they were racially superior to the 
Hutu and Twa, and that they were subjugators of foreign origin.  Yet the evidence for any of 




The impact of the Hamitic Hypothesis on Rwanda’s Political Development 
The impact of this theory of Rwanda’s history was profound.  During the colonial period, it 
led to the institutionalisation of Tutsi dominance and Tutsi privilege throughout the colonial 
administration.  Whereas previously Tutsi had dominated indigenous positions of leadership, 
under Belgian colonial rule such leadership became almost exclusively Tutsi (Mamdani 2001, 
p. 91).  This denied potential Hutu leaders experiences of leadership that might have prepared 
them for the postcolonial period.  The traditional ubuletwa form of clientship was massively 
expanded into a system of corvée, or forced labour, that only the Hutu were required to 
provide.  Whereas Hutu were obligated to provide their labour (without recompense) one or 
more days each week, Tutsi were free to pursue their usual occupations.  In 1933-34 an 
official census was conducted.  Every Rwandan was classified as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, and 
issued with an identity card that listed the bearer’s racial identity.  This facilitated the 
implementation of additional racialised policies.  The Tutsi elite, for example, were given 
preferential access to educational opportunities, and almost exclusive access to post-primary 
education (Atterbury 1970, p. 20; Adeney 1963, p. 8; Bhattacharyya 1967, pp. 58-59).  Even 
at the primary level discrimination was institutionalised, with Tutsi receiving their education 
in a separate stream in French, while Hutu received instruction in Kiswahili (Mamdani 2001, 
pp. 89-90).  The lack of post-primary education for Hutu meant that many lacked the skills 
required to hold leadership and public service roles within the government in the postcolonial 
period.  Church authorities, like the government, internalised the tenets of the Hamitic 
hypothesis.  In an interview in 1935, for example, Neuray quoted Vicar Apostolic 
Monseigneur Léon Classe as commenting: “Evidently, the Watutsi are not ordinary natives.  
Superior race, race of chiefs, they constituted an area more propitious than the others for the 
germination of good seeds” (as cited in Bhattacharyya, 1967, p. 54).  For some Hutu, 




In the late 1950s, as Rwanda moved towards decolonisation, the institutionalisation of Tutsi 
racial privilege – based on the Hamitic hypothesis – came to have a very different impact on 
the nation.  An emergent Hutu counter-elite challenged the power and privilege of the Tutsi 
elite, calling for equal rights and full democracy prior to independence.  In response, the 
incumbent Tutsi leaders “set up a characteristically mythical reinterpretation of the ancient 
socio-political structure of Rwanda” (D’Hertefelt 1960, p. 122).  Emphasis on the Hamitic 
hypothesis was replaced with a focus upon the cooperation between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, and 
the essential feature of Rwandan society was recast as “its homogeneity as a people and a 
nation” (D’Hertefelt 1960, p. 122; Atterbury 1970, p. 58).  The precepts of the Hamitic 
hypothesis had been heavily internalised, however.  When political parties were allowed to 
form, the Charter of the main Tutsi party, UNAR, declared: “Ruandais society is composed 
of individuals of highly unequal value, and it is not equitable to accord the same value to the 
vulgar thoughts of the ordinary man as to the perspicacious judgment of the capable” 
(reproduced in Nkundabagenzi 1961, trans. from Bhattacharyya 1967, p. 248).  
PARMEHUTU, the main Hutu political party, sought to build support through exploiting 
racial divisions and focussing on the long history of oppressive Tutsi rule (Bhattacharyya 
1967, p. 314; Lemarchand 1966, p. 318).  Once again, the Hamitic hypothesis was 
reinterpreted, and according to the Rwanda analyst René Lemarchand, “The Tutsi … [were] 
seen as the Hamitic foreigners who imposed their rule on the unsuspecting Bantu populations 
by cunning and cruelty, using their cows and beautiful women to bait the Hutu into 
submission” (2003, p. 158).  These processes contributed to the growing possibility of 




The heavy focus on race in the decolonisation and democratisation processes, caused by the 
institutionalisation of race-based policies justified by the Hamitic hypothesis, led to repeated 
outbreaks of racially-motivated violence.  While there is a record of Tutsi oppression and 
some violent clashes between Hutu and Tutsi in the precolonial period, this violence was on a 
scale never previously experienced. By the time Rwanda achieved independence in July 
1962, under the stewardship of the Hutu-led Kayibanda government, approximately one 
hundred thousand (mostly Tutsi) refugees had fled the country (Webster 1966, p. 84).  
Eighteen months later, when a small group of these refugees launched the Bugesera invasion, 
it evoked deep fears of a return to Tutsi domination: a replay of the Hamitic tale of Tutsi 
invasion and oppression (United Nations 1964).  Retaliatory massacres swept through the 
country, and approximately 10-14,000 Tutsi were killed in an unprecedented level of racial 
violence (Segal 1964, p. 15; Lemarchand 1970, p. 225).  Perceptions of Rwanda’s history had 
been a crucial contributing factor to the violence.    
 
Postcolonial Representations of Rwanda’s History (1962-1994) 
In the postcolonial period, representations of Rwanda’s history based on the Hamitic 
hypothesis continued to deeply impact upon the nation.  In some respects this is surprising.  
In the aftermath of World War Two, the fallacy and dangers of theories of racial supremacy 
had become widely recognised. The concept of Tutsi racial superiority, one of the three 
pillars of the Hamitic hypothesis, had been roundly rejected in Rwanda during the 
decolonisation and democratisation processes.  Yet it was not until after the 1994 genocide 
that the complete fallacy of the Hamitic hypothesis would be widely accepted by Rwanda’s 
political leaders.  An analysis of presidential speeches and key government documents in the 
period between independence in 1962, and the rise of extremism in the early 1990s, reveals 
ongoing presentations of Rwandan history that were deeply influenced by the Hamitic 
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hypothesis, despite high levels of awareness of the potential for ethnic divisions and 
interethnic violence in the nation.  Presidential speeches and policy documents provide a vital 
insight into perceptions of Rwanda’s history during this period.  Both President Kayibanda 
(1962-73) and Habyarimana (1973-94) held tremendous personal sway as leaders, and there 
is evidence indicating a clear link between presidential speeches and subsequent policy 
implementation (Verwimp 1999, p. 3).  Yet despite Kayibanda serving as a democratically 
elected leader, and Habyarimana seizing power in a coup d’etat and instituting single party 
rule, they each presented a surprisingly consistent narrative of Rwanda’s history, which 
heavily focussed on aspects of the Hamitic hypothesis.   
 
At the heart of this narrative was the tale of Tutsi invasion and oppression.  In 1964, for 
example, a high-level Kayibanda government publication referred to Rwanda’s past 
leadership as: “[a] racist regime, installed by the Tutsi race during its invasion of the country 
400 years ago, [which] has since served to oppress the Hutu population under a heavy, cruel 
and hopeless yoke” (Rwanda 1964, p. 2).  In 1982, Habyarimana recalled the Hamitic 
hypothesis in discussing Rwanda’s history in an interview:   
You know that Rwanda is inhabited by three ethnicities: the Hutu, who are of Bantu 
stock who constitute 85%; the Tutsi, who are of the Hamitic race who constitute 14%; 
and the Batwa, who are pygmoids, 1%. And since the existence of Rwanda, there was 
a monarchy. It was the Tutsi, the minority, who had power for about four centuries. 
(Habyarimana 1982, p. 96). 
Even more tellingly, when asked about national unity in 1985, he gave the following reply:  
I think that it is necessary that I sketch for you some of the history of Rwanda. 
Rwanda was a monarchy. It was comprised of three ethnic groups that arrived from 
another country, and who occupied the territory at different times. The first to arrive, 
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the pygmoids, comprise 1% of the population; the second to arrive, the Hutu, of Bantu 
stock, are farmers, and represent about 85%; and the last to arrive, the Hamitics, the 
Tutsi, comprise 14% of the population. By the play of history and political forces, the 
Tutsi, who are rather in the minority, succeeded in dominating the Hutu for four 
hundred years. And, in 1959, a social revolution took place (Habyarimana 1985, pp. 
194-95).  
These presentations of Rwanda’s history are heavily focussed on ethnicity, to the exclusion of 
other aspects of pre-colonial and colonial Rwandan society. It is particularly notable that 
there is simply no mention of colonial rule within these narratives, despite the huge impact of 
such rule upon Rwanda.   
 
It is difficult to ascertain the motivations of each President in presenting this selective 
narrative of Rwandan history.  Despite the ostensible focus of both Kayibanda and 
Habyarimana on national unity, and an emphasis on national rather than ethnic identity, these 
narratives reinforced the Hamitic concept of the Tutsi as foreign subjugators; overlooked the 
massive impact of colonialism on race relations in Rwanda; and reinforced the salience of 
ethnic identity.  For both Kayibanda and Habyarimana, however, ethnicity had previously 
been a crucible around which they had garnered political support in periods of crisis. After 
the Bugesera invasion, for example, the Kayibanda government experienced a resurgence in 
popular support, as well as reaping the benefits of a largely silenced opposition (Lemarchand 
1970, p. 227; United Nations 1964).  Habyarimana utilised the issue of ethnicity to 
(retrospectively) justify toppling the democratic Kayibanda government and instituting single 
party rule (see for example Habyarimana 1980, p. 238). While neither wished to focus 
heavily on ethnicity in times of calm, each sought to maintain the capacity to utilise ethnic 
discourse as a tool with which to garner support in times of need. This may explain each 
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president’s willingness to focus on the Hamitic hypothesis in presenting narratives of 
Rwanda’s history.  
The Impact on Rwanda’s Political Development 
As in the colonial period, the impact of these interpretations of Rwanda’s history in the 
postcolonial period was profound. Both Kayibanda and Habyarimana legitimated a simplistic 
and dubious interpretation of Rwandan history whereby the Tutsi were seen as non-
indigenous oppressors of the Hutu. Continued legitimation of these aspects of the Hamitic 
hypothesis facilitated perceptions of the Tutsi as an ‘outgroup’, a group outside the universe 
of obligation of the dominant group (Fein 1979, p. 9).  This is one of the foundational 
elements of a society at risk of genocide (Fein 1979, p. 9).  Additionally, both Presidents 
contributed to the ongoing politicisation of ethnicity.  By presenting a narrative of Rwanda’s 
history that focussed on ethnicity, they legitimated an ongoing focus on ethnic identity.  By 
presenting a narrative that singularly highlighted a history of Tutsi oppression (and ignored 
the more complex reality of the massive impact of colonialism on intergroup relations in 
Rwanda and on Rwanda’s development more broadly), they legitimated at least some level of 
ongoing ethnic division.  Such politicisation of ethnicity, however, has also been clearly 
identified as a risk factor that can increase the risk of genocide (Mayersen 2010). 
 
Perceptions of the Tutsi minority as ‘outsiders’ or ‘foreign subjugators’ were undoubtedly a 
contributing factor to the unwillingness of both the Kayibanda and Habyarimana 
governments to address the refugee problem.  At the time of independence, approximately 
100,000 Rwandan (mostly Tutsi) refugees were scattered in neighbouring countries; by 1964 
the figure had risen to 336,000 (Webster 1966, p. 84; Sayinzoga 1982, p. 51).  Refugees who 
wished to return to Rwanda were often far from welcome.  President Kayibanda, for example, 
even when promoting national unity, skilfully excluded refugees in his speech on the 
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occasion of the New Year in 1963:  “We want fraternal understanding based on justice 
between the different social groups, races and ideologies which are on Rwandan soil” 
(Kayibanda 1963, p. 25).  After the massacres following the Bugesera invasion, however, the 
Kayibanda government sought assistance from the United Nations to address the refugee 
issue (Rwanda 1964, pp. 29-30).  There was no effective response to this request.  Under 
Habyarimana, the refugee issue continued to simmer as the regime refused to allow a right of 
return.  In 1980, for example, Habyarimana responded to an interview question on the issue: 
“Each square metre [of Rwanda] is occupied, we have the highest density in Africa on 
increasingly diminished arable lands, we therefore cannot bring back all these refugees so 
that they [can] settle in Rwanda” (Habyarimana 1980, p. 223).  (While Rwanda did face 
ecological pressures, they did not stop Habyarimana encouraging large families and 
discouraging family planning during this period, however.)  In 1983, he responded to a 
similar question by remarking “he who is Rwandan is one who has a Rwandan identity card”, 
again refusing to recognise the complexities of the issue (Habyarimana 1983, p. 24).  In 
frustration at their continued ostracisation, it was second generation Tutsi refugees in Uganda 
that formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front, invading Rwanda and triggering civil war in 1990.  
The RPF invasion was a crucial component in the cascade of events that led to the 1994 
genocide, yet it might easily have been averted had genuine attempts been made to deal with 
the refugee issue.     
 
Ultimately, the representations of history in Rwanda associated with the Hamitic hypothesis 
were a significant contributing factor to the 1994 genocide.  This can evidenced through the 
propaganda that became virulent in the country as extremist forces gained power in the early 
1990s.  The RPF and Tutsi were pitted as foreign and feudal oppressors, seeking to ‘return’ 
12 
 
Rwanda to a state of Tutsi dominance and Hutu oppression (Des Forges 1999, p. 73).  
According to Lemarchand:  
What emerges from [extremist propaganda] is an image of the Tutsi as both alien and 
clever – not unlike the image of the Jews in Nazi propaganda.  His alienness 
disqualifies him as a member of the national community; his cleverness turns him into 
a permanent threat to the unsuspecting Hutu.  Nothing short of physical liquidation 
can properly deal with such danger (1995, p. 62). 
In November 1992 Hutu extremist Léon Mugesera (who had close ties with Habyarimana) 
gave a speech in Gisenyi where he concluded that: “the fatal error we made in 1959 was to let 
them [the Tutsi] leave the country. Their home is Ethiopia, and we are going to find them a 
shortcut, namely the Nyabarongo River. I must insist on this point. We must act forcefully!  
Get rid of them!” (as cited in Twagilimana, 2003, p. 106).  Indeed, when the genocide did 
take place, tens of thousands of Rwandans’ dead bodies were dumped in the Nyaborongo 
river (Hintjens 1999, p. 255).  The role of the Hamitic hypothesis in contributing to the 
propaganda that sought to justify the genocide is clear.  
 
Representations of the Rwandan genocide  
In the period subsequent to the Rwanda genocide, the fallacy of the Hamitic hypothesis has 
been widely recognised.  So too has the role of Belgian colonial rule in imposing this 
interpretation of Rwanda’s history on the nation, and in implementing policies that 
institutionalised its dangerous precepts.  In the post-genocide period in Rwanda there has 
been deep reflection on the nation’s history, rejection of previously accepted narratives and a 
recognition of the dangers of externally-imposed narratives.  Yet while many points of 
discontinuity can be charted in representations of Rwanda’s history in the pre- and post-
genocide periods, in the final section of this paper I highlight a disturbing example of 
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continuity.  In this case, I analyse an official publication of the ICTR, 100 Days in the Land 
of the Thousand Hills, which presents a selective account of the genocide in Rwanda.  
Moreover, as an ICTR publication, 100 Days has the potential to have a wide impact, and be 
interpreted as an impartial account of the genocide.   
 
100 Days in the Land of the Thousand Hills is an English language graphic novel published 
in 2011 by the external relations office of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
based in Arusha, Tanzania.1  Designed to “facilitate the understanding of young people in the 
region” about the genocide, its target audience is children eight years and above (ICTR 2011, 
pp. 4, 6).  The graphic novel recounts the events leading up to, during, and following the 
Rwandan genocide in 46 A4 full colour pages.  It moves between two interrelated narratives, 
presenting events that occurred at a national level interspersed with the stories of two 
Rwandan children – one Hutu and one Tutsi – as they experience and ultimately survive the 
genocide.  Events are represented not just through the text, but with the aid of the 
accompanying illustrations, which sometimes tell a story of their own.   
 
From the first reading, it is clear that 100 Days has made a genuine attempt to present a 
relatively detailed account of the events of the genocide. The reader develops a strong sense 
of the propaganda of the period, and the chaos and confusion during the genocide.  We 
witness the flight of the two leading protagonists and their families, their attempts to reach 
safe havens, and then feel the closing net of the perpetrators as these seemingly safe locations 
are overrun by genocidaires.  The reader is drawn into the desperate struggle of Kagabo, 
Françoise and their families as the narrative presents the genocide from the perspective of its 
                                                          




victims.  There is no happy ending; while both the children survive the genocide through an 
extraordinary turn of events, they are both orphaned in the process.  The personal narrative 
creates empathy for those targeted in the genocide, contributing to the document’s goal of 
promoting genocide prevention through educating youth (ICTR 2011, p. 4).   
 
For all that it does convey, however, 100 days is also notable for its selectivity.  The most 
egregious omission is the absence of any reference to the inaction of the United Nations and 
international community as the genocide took place.  The role of UNAMIR (United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda) is presented in a manner which minimises reference to its 
withdrawal.  At the outbreak of the genocide, 100 days recounts, UNAMIR attempted to 
protect the Rwandan Prime Minister.  “The UN troops encounter many roadblocks”, the 
reader is told, “and have to plead to be allowed to continue” (ICTR 2011, p. 16).  But this 
seeming bravery is in vain, as soldiers from the Presidential Guard disarm the UN soldiers at 
the Prime Minister’s compound, killing the ten Belgian soldiers.  Shortly thereafter, another 
cell depicts “A detachment of Belgian UN troops” stationed outside the Ecole Technique 
Officielle, a secondary school where many took refuge in the initial days of the genocide 
(ICTR 2011, p. 19).  A close-up presents a violent argument between a militia soldier and a 
UN soldier, as the UN soldier pleads on behalf of the refugees.  Next, however, we see only 
retreating vehicles as a caption informs: “Immediately after the departure of the Belgians, 
interahamwe militiamen enter the school” (ICTR 2011, p. 20).  While earlier references to 
UNAMIR identify the soldiers as ‘UN troops’ and ‘Belgian UN troops’, in this cell it is ‘the 
Belgians’ who depart.  The UN signage on the vehicles, large and obvious in earlier cells, is 
now small and indistinct.  There is no explanation provided for the withdrawal, and the 
narrative quickly moves to new events.    The silence surrounding the reason for the UN 
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withdrawal, and around the absence of the international community during the genocide, is in 
stark contrast to the detailed presentation of other aspects of the genocide.   
 
There is no representation of Rwanda in the post-genocide period.  Time in 100 days is 
compressed; disjointed; sometimes out of sequence, and the post-genocide period disappears 
in this structure.  From 17 July 1994 (when the RPF consolidates control over all Rwanda, 
bringing the genocide to an end), the text immediately jumps to the ICTR.  There is no 
discussion of Rwanda’s attempts to rebuild as a nation, no mention of transitional justice 
processes in Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide.  Rather, on the final two-page spread 
of the narrative a group of school children are visiting the ICTR (ICTR 2011, pp. 52-53).  
There, they learn that the tribunal has jailed many of the leading perpetrators for their role in 
the genocide.  In this way, it is the ICTR that provides closure in the post-genocide period.  
The final sentence of the narrative informs the reader, “There can be no peace without some 
form of justice for the victims of the genocide in Rwanda” (ICTR 2011, p. 53).  Yet the 
voices of Rwandans in this process are as unheard as that of the school children carefully 
instructed “to be silent at all times” in the court room (ICTR 2011, p. 52). 
 
These narrative choices potentially facilitate a much more positive view of the role of the UN 
and international community during and after the genocide than might otherwise be justified.  
The culpability of the UN in abandoning refugees at the Ecole Technique Officielle, who 
were subsequently massacred, is not addressed.  The Security Council decision to withdraw 
UNAMIR, even as the genocide progressed, has been recognised by the UN itself as an 
institutional failure, of profound consequence for the progression of the genocide, yet there is 
only an oblique reference to these events (UN 1999, p. 3).  In the aftermath of the genocide, 
the ICTR is painted in a wholly positive light, as the vehicle through which Rwandans might 
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obtain a measure of justice, closure and ‘peace’.  Yet the very substantial indigenous 
endeavours towards these ends are not mentioned.  To the reader, this implies that it is only 
the ICTR that can provide these positive benefits.   
The Impact of 100 Days 
It is difficult to assess the impact of 100 days.  Published in 2011, it currently appears to be 
available only in English.  English is an official language in Rwanda, however it is estimated 
that only four per cent of the population speak it (Steflja 2012).  This severely curbs the 
document’s ability to reach Rwandan children and youth.  Other countries in the region, 
including Tanzania where the ICTR is located, have somewhat higher English literacy levels, 
although language remains a barrier.  Nevertheless, this is a document with the potential to 
have a large impact on how the genocide is understood in the region.  The document offers 
access to a free, seemingly independent source of information about the events of the 
genocide in Rwanda, from a source with a high degree of credibility.  It is likely to be 
interpreted as providing an authentic statement on Rwanda’s past.  Yet just like the Hamitic 
hypothesis, it is an externally imposed interpretation of Rwanda’s history.  Moreover, the 
manner in which the role of the international community is represented – and not represented 
– suggests that political factors have influenced the content of 100 Days.  According to the 
introductory remarks in the document, it is designed to contribute to genocide prevention 
efforts (ICTR 2011, p. 4).  From an international perspective, however, one of the most 
important lessons that can be learned from the genocide concerns the role of the international 
community.  The failure of the UN and of international political will to intervene in the 
genocide has been well documented.  By omitting this from the narrative, 100 Days may 
gloss over international culpability during the genocide, but it does so at the cost of learning 





Rwanda has been subject to externally imposed, partial representations of its history since the 
earliest days of European influence there.  The endeavours to understand, interpret and 
represent Rwanda’s past I have analysed in this paper were not undertaken with overtly 
malign intent, but were influenced by a range of political motivations.  For Speke and other 
colonial ethnologists, evidence of Rwanda’s history was interpreted to align with pre-existing 
theories that upheld contemporary notions of the superiority of white civilisations.   In the 
postcolonial period, opportunities to move beyond the discredited Hamitic hypothesis and 
embrace a unified national identity in Rwanda gave way to representations of Rwandan 
history that continued be motivated by factors other than increasing knowledge about the 
past.  The impact of these representations was ultimately catastrophic.  In the post-genocide 
period, the Rwandan government has made extensive (although not always uncontroversial) 
efforts to memorialise the genocide, to learn lessons for future genocide prevention and to 
promote national reconciliation.  While the ICTR has undoubtedly contributed to these 
processes, 100 Days demonstrates the ongoing politicisation of Rwanda’s history. The 
potential negative impact of such politically motivated representations is very real.  This 
article highlights the need for greater cognisance of the potential power of historical 
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